This paper analyzes the e¤ects of buyer and seller risk aversion in …rst and secondprice auctions. The setting is the classic one of symmetric and independent private values, with ex ante homogeneous bidders. However, the seller is able to optimally set the reserve price. In both auctions the seller's optimal reserve price is shown to decrease in his own risk aversion, and more so in the …rst-price auction. Thus, greater seller risk aversion increases the ex post e¢ ciency of both auctions, and especially that of the …rst-price auction. The seller's optimal reserve price in the …rst-price, but not in the second-price, auction decreases in the buyers'risk aversion.
Introduction
Much of the literature that compares the e¤ects of risk aversion across auctions assumes each auction has the same, exogenously determined reserve price. The predominant example is the comparison of a …rst-price auction (FPA) to a secondprice auction (SPA) with the same reserve price, in a symmetric independent private values setting.
1 The well-known result in this case is that risk averse bidders bid more in the FPA than they do in the SPA. However, the reserve price in most real auctions is set by the seller. To the extent that it in ‡uences bidding behavior and depends on the type of auction, the endogeneity of the reserve price should be taken into account. In particular, the comparative statics of the optimal reserve price are of direct interest because they bear on ex post e¢ ciency. Lowering the reserve price decreases the probability of the ine¢ cient event in which no sale occurs because the maximum value of the bidders exceeds the seller's value but not the reserve price.
This paper focuses on the e¤ects of buyer and seller risk aversion on the seller's optimal reserve price in standard …rst and second-price auctions. Sharp results are obtained by restricting attention to the otherwise simplest setting, that of symmetric and independent private values. Our three main results are Theorems 1 3:
Theorem 1 establishes that if the seller and/or the buyers are risk averse, then the seller sets a lower reserve price in the FPA than in the SPA. This is in contrast to when all parties are risk neutral, in which case the revenue equivalence theorem implies that the seller's optimal reserve price is the same in both auctions. 1 We use the term FPA for both the …rst-price sealed-bid auction and the strategically equivalent Dutch (descending) auction. We use the term SPA for both the second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey) auction and the "button" model of the English ascending-bid auction, as they have the same dominant strategy equilibria in our private values setting. (Milgrom and Weber, 1982) .
Risk aversion thus makes the FPA more ex post e¢ cient than the SPA. The result hinges on how the FPA equilibrium bid function is a¤ected by a marginal increase in the reserve price. Risk averse bidders increase their bids less than do risk neutral bidders, and a risk averse seller values the increase in the bids of the high bidders relatively less than does a risk neutral seller because of diminishing marginal utility.
Both forces lower the seller's marginal incentive to raise the reserve price.
Theorem 2 establishes that in either auction, a more risk averse seller sets a lower reserve price. Thus, the more risk averse the seller, the more ex post e¢ cient are both auctions. The intuition is straightforward: a more risk averse seller values more (on the margin) a decrease in the risk of not selling the object. The proof, however, is surprisingly intricate.
3
Theorem 3 establishes that in the FPA, the seller sets a lower reserve price if the bidders are more risk averse. (Bidder risk aversion does not a¤ect the SPA equilibrium.) This theorem requires more assumptions: either (a) the reverse hazard rate function of the buyers' values is decreasing, and the buyers and/or the seller exhibit nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, or (b) the buyers exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. Under these conditions the rate at which the FPA bid function increases in the reserve price is smaller when the bidders are more risk averse, and so the seller has less incentive to raise the reserve price. This e¤ect is stronger if the seller is also risk averse, as then the fact that more risk averse bidders bid higher than less risk averse bidders implies that the seller has a lower marginal utility valuation for the increase in their bids caused by an increase in the reserve price.
The remainder of the paper begins with the model in Section 2. Useful technical results are in Section 3. The FPA equilibrium is studied in Section 4. The seller's preferences over auctions with the same reserve price are determined in Section 5, and his optimal reserve prices are examined in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
3 Theorem 3 in Waehrer et al. (1998) is our Theorem 2 for the case of risk neutral bidders (and a more general information structure), the proof of which relies on a point-by-point renormalization of the utility functions. Our proof takes a quite di¤erent approach.
Model
An indivisible object is to be possibly sold to one of n 2 potential buyers through either a FPA or a SPA with a reserve price. Each buyer i 2 N = f1; :::; ng has a private value for the object, v i ; which is unknown to the others. We consider …rst and second-price auctions with a reserve price r 2 (L; H).
5
In either auction a buyer with a value v < r abstains from bidding. In a SPA, the dominant strategy of a buyer with v r is to submit a bid equal to v: We restrict attention to this equilibrium of the SPA.
Turning to the FPA, it is useful to de…ne G F n 1 : If a buyer has value v;
then G(v) is the probability that every other buyer has a lower value. Let g G 
that satis…es the initial condition b(r; r) = r (e.g., Maskin and Riley, 1984) . We restrict attention to this equilibrium of the FPA. 6 Observe that b 1 (r; r) = 0; and
If u B satis…es CARA, so that R B a for some a 0; we let b a denote the FPA equilibrium bid function. In this case the di¤erential equation (1) can be solved to
From (2) we see that for CARA buyers, the equilibrium bid function strictly increases in the reserve price:
and that increasing the risk aversion of the bidders lowers the rate at which the bid function increases in the reserve price: for all v > r; @b Because of the normalization u B (0) = 0; for t 0 we have (t) 0; and hence
It is well known that ifû B is another utility function such thatû B (0) = 0 Pratt, 1964 , Theorem 1).
We make repeated use of the following two lemmas, which are proved in the Appendix. The …rst is a variation of the "Ranking Lemma"of Milgrom (2004) . 6 It is the unique equilibrium if R B is nonincreasing (Maskin and Riley, 2003) .
Lemma 2 For c < d 1 and i = 1; 2; let the functions
4 Properties of the FPA Equilibrium
The following are well known and easily proved properties of the FPA equilibrium:
7 As we are concerned with the seller's incentives for setting the reserve price, we need to further determine how the equilibrium varies with the reserve price. Our …rst proposition establishes an upper bound on b 2 (v; r): This derivative is equal to G(r)=G(v) if the bidders are risk neutral, as can be seen by setting a = 0 in (3). This is in fact the upper bound.
where R B and are evaluated at v b(v; r) > 0:
Hence, since h(r) = 0; we have h(v) 0, and so b 2 G(r)=G ( 
Our third proposition determines the e¤ects of the bidders becoming more risk averse. Part (i) shows that the bid function increases in their risk aversion, generalizing the well-known result that bids are higher when the bidders are risk averse than when they are risk neutral. The remainder of the proposition establishes more surprising results, assuming that (DRH) holds, and the seller and/or the buyers exhibit nonincreasing absolute risk aversion. Parts (ii) and (iii), respectively, show that then, the more risk averse are the bidders, the more rapidly the bid function increases in a bidder's value, but the more slowly it increases in the reserve price.
The latter property is largely why the seller's optimal reserve price decreases in the risk aversion of the bidders, as we shall see.
Proposition 3 Letû B be another function satisfying the same assumptions as u B ,
with an absolute risk aversion measure satisfying b
If (DRH) holds, and R B and/or b R B is nonincreasing, then
Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3. It is e¢ cient to prove the parts in a certain order. Let P2i refer to Proposition 2(i); etc.
P2ii: We apply Lemma 1(ii) to 1 b 1 ( ; r): Recall 1 b 1 (r; r) > 0: Suppose 1 b 1 = 0 at some v r: Then v > r: Di¤erentiating (1) with respect to v; and evaluating the result at this (v; r); yields
We have (v b) > 0 because b < v; and`0(v) < 0 by (DRH). Hence, at this (v; r);
Lemma 1(ii) now implies that for any v r; 1 b 1 > 0:
P3i: We apply Lemma 1(iii) tob( ; r) b( ; r): We haveb(r; r) = b(r; r).
This and (1) yieldsb
Lemma 1(iii) now impliesb > b for all v > r.
P3ii: We apply Lemma 1(ii) tob 1 ( ; r) b 1 ( ; r) on intervals of the form
where k # r as k ! 1: We will show thatb 1 ( ; r) > b 1 ( ; r) on each interval, and hence on (r; H]: To obtain k ; let fv k g be a sequence such that v k # r: Sinceb(r; r) = b(r; r) andb(v k ; r) > b(v k ; r); the mean value theorem implies k 2 (r; v k ) exists such
Becauseb 1 = b 1 at (v; r); from (1) we obtain^ (v b ) = (v b): Hence, using (1) to di¤erentiateb 1 and b 1 yieldŝ
where the inequality follows from (5),b 1 > 0; andb 1 < 1 (by Proposition 2(ii); since we have (DRH) here). Lemma 1(ii) now impliesb 1 ( ; r) > b 1 ( ; r) on each ( k ; H]:
P2i: The continuity of R B implies the existence of a < 1 such that a > R B on [0; H L]: Letb be the equilibrium for a CARAû B with b R B a: Thenb is given by (2) and satis…esb 2 > 0 for any v r: We apply Lemma 1(iii) to b 2 ( ; r) b 2 ( ; r):
We have b 2 (r; r) =b 2 (r; r): Suppose b 2 b 2 for some v > r: As (1) holds for both b 1 andb 1 ; di¤erentiating b 1 b 1 with respect to r yields
Thus, because b 2 b 2 and`> 0;
Since ( 
Seller Preferences over Auctions with the Same Reserve Price
Let i = I; II denote, respectively, the FPA and the SPA, and let V i (r) be the seller's equilibrium expected utility in auction i with reserve price r: The revenue equivalence theorem establishes that V I (r) = V II (r) if all participants are risk neutral.
As shown by Maskin and Riley (1984) , risk aversion on the part of the seller and/or the buyers causes the seller to prefer the FPA to the SPA if both have the same reserve price. 9 This is due to two e¤ects. The …rst is a direct "revenue e¤ect":
buyer risk aversion causes them to bid more in the FPA. The second is a "risk e¤ect": the high bid in a FPA is a less risky random variable than it is in a SPA, and so preferred by a risk averse seller.
For future reference we record this result as part (i) of the following proposition.
Part (ii) records the result that in a FPA, the seller prefers the buyers to be more risk averse, a consequence of the fact that they then bid more. 
Optimal Reserve Prices
We now derive expressions for V i (r) and V 0 i (r) in order to study the seller's optimal reserve prices. The rules of the auctions and the nature of their equilibria imply
Di¤erentiating (7) yields
The …rst term in (9) is the seller's marginal bene…t from raising the reserve price in the FPA, due to the resulting increase in the bid function on [r; H]: The second term is the marginal cost, due to the lost sales at price b(r; r) = r caused by a marginal increase in the reserve price.
Di¤erentiating (8) yields
Again, the …rst and second terms are the seller's marginal bene…t and marginal cost of raising the reserve price. Comparing (9) to (10) shows that the marginal cost is the same in the SPA as in the FPA. The marginal bene…t of raising the reserve price in the SPA di¤ers, as it is due to the resulting increase in the price received in the event that precisely one bidder has a value greater than r:
Let R i denote the set of reserve prices that maximize V i (r): The next proposition establishes that in both auctions, optimal reserve prices exist and are in the interval (v 0 ; H): Furthermore, the optimal reserve price in the SPA is unique and invariant to the number of bidders under the regularity assumption of Myerson (1981) , that a bidder's virtual valuation increases in his value.
The proposition refers to the function
From (10) Proposition 5 Both R I and R II are nonempty subsets of (v 0 ; H): Any r II 2 R II satis…es (r II ) = 0; and R II is a singleton and independent of the number of bidders
is strictly increasing on (L; H):
Proof. The …rst term in (9) 
The …rst term is nonpositive for r v 0 :
is strictly increasing,
This interval then contains a unique r II satisfying (r II ) = 0;
and so R II = fr II g: Since does not depend on n; neither does this r II :
We now show that the seller sets a lower reserve price in the FPA than in the SPA if he and/or the bidders are risk averse. The proof is based on the observation that because the seller's marginal cost of raising the reserve price is the same in both auctions, the di¤erence in his incentives is the di¤erence in the marginal bene…ts:
(9) and (10) yield
It is easy to see that this di¤erence is negative if the bidders and/or the seller is risk averse. By the revenue equivalence theorem, V Theorem 1 Suppose R B and/or R S is positive. Then, for any r I 2 R I and r II 2 R II ; we have r I < r II :
Proof. Write (12) as
Since Our second theorem shows that in either auction, a more risk averse seller sets a lower reserve price. The intuition is that the more risk averse the seller is, the more he wishes to avoid the risk of not selling the object for a pro…table price.
Theorem 2 Letû S satisfy the same assumptions as u S , with b R S > R S : Let b R i and R i be the sets of optimal reserve prices givenû S and u S ; for i = I; II: Then, for anyr i 2 b R i and r i 2 R i ; we haver I < r I andr II < r II :
Proof. We …rst prover II < r II : W.l.o.g., we may assumer
From (8) we obtain V II (r) b V II (r) = T 1 (r) + T 2 (r); where
Let r 2 (v 0 ;r II ): Then (13) implies T 1 (r) < 0 = T 1 (r II ) and T 2 (r) < T 2 (r II ): Hence,
We conclude that for all r 2 (v 0 ;r II );
where the second inequality follows fromr II 2 b R II . This provesr II r II . Now, again by Pratt (1964, Theorem 1) , for any y > v 0 we havê
Hence, usingû S in (11) We now use a similiar approach to prover I < r I . W.l.o.g., we may assumê
For any y > v 0 we still have (14), and hence
We thus have u From (7) we therefore obtain, for r 2 (v 0 ;r I ),
Observe that for v 0 < r < v <r I ; we have b(v; r) < b(r I ; r) <r I ; and so u S (b(v; r)) < u S (b(v; r)). This implies that for r 2 (v 0 ;r I ), Zr
The two previous displays yield, for any r 2 (v 0 ;r I ),
This implies
where the second inequality follows fromr I 2 b R I . Hence,r I r I : To rule out equality, observe from (9) that
De…ne b (r) similarly fromû S . Since b(v; r) > r for v > r; from Pratt (1964, (20) )
This implies (r I ) > b (r I ) (using b 2 0;r I > v 0 ; and (14)). Hence,
This provesr I 6 = r I ; and hencer I < r I :
Our third and …nal theorem establishes that in the FPA, the seller sets a lower reserve price if the bidders are more risk averse. The theorem requires that either the bidders satisfy CARA, or that (DRH) holds and at least one of the two bidder utility functions being compared satis…es nonincreasing absolute risk aversion. The logic of the result is twofold. First, under these conditions the FPA bid function increases in the reserve price at a slower rate when the bidders are more risk averse. This lowers the incentive of the seller to raise the reserve price. Second, because more risk averse bidders bid more, the increase in their bids in response to an increase in the reserve price generates a lower marginal utility increase for the (weakly) risk averse seller. The proof re ‡ects these two forces. Proof. Letting b V (r) be the seller's payo¤ givenû B and reserve r; (9) implies
The concavity of u S ; together withb(v; r) > b(v; r) (by Proposition 3(i)); yield 
Concluding Discussion
We have shown that when the seller sets the reserve price, he sets it lower the more risk averse he is and, in a …rst-price auction, the more risk averse the buyers are. The seller's optimal reserve price is lower in the …rst-price than in the secondprice auction, unless all parties are risk neutral. Risk aversion thus reduces the probability of not selling the object when a buyer's value for it exceeds that of the seller, especially in the …rst-price auction.
The buyers may agree, ex ante, with the seller's preference for the …rst-price auction. Indeed, if they exhibit constant (or increasing) absolute risk aversion, every type of buyer weakly (strictly) prefers at the interim stage the …rst-price to a secondprice auction that has the same reserve price (Matthews, 1987) . Ipso facto, in these cases the buyers prefer the …rst-price auction if it has the lower reserve price, as it does when the seller sets the reserve price and he or the buyers are risk averse.
By continuity, the buyers must also prefer the …rst-price auction if their absolute risk aversion measure is approximately constant, so long as they and/or the seller are risk averse.
10 More generally, buyers with values in the interval (r I ; r II ] strictly prefer the FPA, and hence so must the buyers with values in some interval (r I ;v); wherev > r II .
We have focused tightly in this paper on the e¤ects of risk aversion on optimal reserve prices in two standard auctions, holding …xed their other features. Endogenizing these other features and determining the e¤ects of risk aversion on their levels is a topic for future research. For example, if the seller is able to charge bidders an entry fee, he may wish to do so if the bidders are risk averse (Maskin and Riley, 1983 ), but not if he is risk averse and can also set the reserve price (Waehrer et al., 1998) . The nature of optimal combinations of entry fees and reserves when the seller or buyers are risk averse is unknown. Another example is entry: if each of a large number of potential bidders must pay a cost to learn his value, the number of bidders becomes endogenous. In this case the seller may want to lower the reserve price in order to increase entry. 11 Our results suggest that risk aversion on the part of the seller or buyers should strengthen this e¤ect, especially in the …rst-price auction. 12 .
Future work may also generalize the setting of our results. It may be fruitful, for example, to consider asymmetric bidders with di¤erent value distributions, which give rise to a di¤erent ex post ine¢ ciency (sale to the wrong bidder) than the one (no sale) that we have considered. Settings with ex post risk or interdependent values are naturally of interest as well.
that when " < "; every type of buyer interim prefers the FPA to the SPA when the seller sets the reserve prices.
11 The e¤ects of endogenous entry on optimal reserve prices are studied, in risk neutral settings,
by McAfee and McMillan (1987) , Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993) , and Levin and Smith (1994) .
12 Endogenous entry can reverse the seller's preference for the FPA, since the SPA may induce more entry if the buyers have DARA risk preferences, as is shown in Smith and Levin (1996) . This reversal should occur less often, however, when the seller sets the reserve price, since he sets it lower in the FPA.
